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Abstract
We investigate the e®ect of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) on economic growth by
employing the data of 132 countries for the period from 1995 to 2008, considering the
role of corruption in each country as an absorptive factor. The estimation results indicate
that, although FDI alone does not promote economic growth, it has a signi¯cant e®ect
on economic growth if the interaction term between FDI and corruption is considered.
The threshold level of corruption separating the negative and positive e®ects of FDI on
economic growth is approximately in the 10th percentile from the least corrupt countries.
The existence of a corruption threshold implies a counter-intuitive proposition: that FDI
inhibits economic growth in countries where corruption is below a corruption threshold,
and promotes economic growth in countries where corruption is above the threshold. Our
results are robust even if we use di®erent corruption indices and conduct the instrumental
variable estimation to address endogeneity problems.
Keywords: Foreign Direct Investment; Economic Growth; Corruption
JEL Classi¯cations: D73; F23; F43
1 Introduction
This study empirically examines the e®ect of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) on economic
growth, taking into account the corruption level in each country. Since the late 1990s, FDI
°ows among countries have risen dramatically with the current of economic globalization
(see Figure 1). As FDI is thought to be a potential source of economic growth, especially
for developing countries, their governments initiate policies to actively attracting FDI. As a
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insightful comments and suggestions. Samreth wishes to acknowledge the ¯nancial support from the Japan
Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS). However, any remaining errors are, of course, our own.
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direct e®ect, FDI-based capital °ows enhance the accumulation of capital in a host country,
and as an indirect e®ect, FDI contributes to economic growth in a host country by promoting
productivity growth through technology transfer. In addition, FDI is attractive because it is
not a borrowing fund, so that host countries need not be concerned about debt accumulation.
The expectation to earn pro¯ts through market expansion and to take advantage of the
relatively low factor price in host countries serve as incentives for multinational enterprises
(MNEs) to implement FDI. This is particularly the case for FDI °ows from developed to
developing countries. Endogenous growth theory suggests that knowledge and technology are
necessities for improving productivity (see e.g. Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Barro and
Sala-i-Martin, 2004). Technology di®usion by FDI improves productivity and, as a result,
enhances economic development in host countries.
However, previous studies, using country-level data, show that FDI alone does not nec-
essarily have a signi¯cant impact on economic growth (e.g. Borensztein et al., 1998; Alfaro
et al., 2004). In addition, most previous researches at the ¯rm level ¯nd that FDI has an
insigni¯cant or small e®ect on productivity and e±ciency. These results are con¯rmed in the
works of Haddad and Harrison (1993) for Morocco, Kokko (1994) for Mexico, and Aiken and
Harrison (1999) for Venezuela.
Another strand of literature points out that FDI °ows have a positive impact on eco-
nomic growth if a host country possesses an appropriate absorptive capacity. For example,
Borensztein et al. (1998) show that FDI promotes economic growth in a country in which
human capital is above a certain level. Bengoa and Sanchez-Robles (2003) analyze the case
of Latin American countries and indicate that FDI induces economic growth depending on
human capital, economic stability, and liberalized markets. Balasubramanyam et al. (1996)
con¯rm that FDI enhances economic growth more strongly in countries with export-oriented
trade policies. Alfaro et al. (2004) show that ¯nancial development plays an important role
as an absorptive factor in host countries, complementing the FDI impact on economic growth.
Similarly, Azman-Saini et al. (2010), using a threshold regression, verify that FDI can lead
to economic growth if the host country's ¯nancial development level is above a threshold.
Our study di®ers from those discussed above in that it focuses on institutional factors as
an absorptive factor in host countries.1 Institutional factors include various aspects such as
1In an earlier study, Khamfula (2007) considers the role of corruption in examining the e®ect of FDI on
economic growth, ¯nding that the level of corruption negatively impacts the e®ect of FDI on economic growth.
However, the estimation results of this study may be biased due to endogeneity problems, as instrumental
variable estimation is not conducted. Further, because the number of countries used in Khamfula (2007) is
very few, there may also exist a problem of sample selection bias. Studies on the e®ect of institutions on
economic growth are available in many researches as follows. Hall and Jones (1999) show the negative e®ects
of institutional factors on economic development. Mauro (1995) argues that corruption inhibits economic
growth. By considering the role of democracy, M¶endez and Sep¶ulveda (2006) note that the level of corruption
that maximizes economic growth is not necessarily zero in the case of countries with su±cient democracy, and
that there exists an inverted U-shaped relationship between corruption and economic growth. For theoretical
studies examining the relationship between corruption and economic growth, see Ehrlich and Lui, (1999),
Barreto (2000), and Ellis and Fender (2006), among others.
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corruption, democracy, and racial and religious diversity. However, among these, we especially
focus on the role of corruption for several reasons. First, as a condition for ¯nancial support
or foreign aid, while international organizations such as the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) require an elimination of, or at least a reduction in, corruption in a host
country, pro¯t-seeking ¯rms engaging in FDI may invest in those countries where regulations
are loose or poorly enforced. Second, some countries with high levels of both corruption and
FDI in°ows also achieve high levels of economic growth. For example, during the period from
2005 through 2007, the average FDI net in°ow into Cambodia was 7.64 percent as a share
of GDP, which is fairly higher than the world average.2 While Cambodian FDI net in°ows
were very high, the country is also ranked as one of the most corrupt in the region and in
the world. With a corruption perception index (CPI) of 2.0 in 2007, it is ranked 162 among
179 countries by the Transparency International (TI).3 However, despite its high corruption
level, Cambodia has achieved a remarkable rate of economic growth over the last few years.
Its average per capita GDP growth rate between 2005 and 2008 was 8.0 percent according to
World Bank data. The achievement of these high growth rates can be attributed to several
factors, among which FDI is undoubtedly signi¯cant.4
Therefore, from the above discussion, we test the hypothesis that corruption serves as an
important channel through which FDI a®ects economic growth. To investigate this hypothesis,
we use annual data of 132 countries over the period from 1995 through 2008 for estimation.
Consistent with Borensztein et al. (1998) and Alfaro et al. (2004), the estimation results show
that FDI alone does not necessarily promote economic growth. However, when its interaction
term with corruption is added, we ¯nd that FDI inhibits economic growth in those countries
with low corruption, and promotes economic growth in the countries with high corruption
levels. Therefore, corruption works as a \positive" absorptive factor. The threshold level of
corruption, separating the negative and positive impacts of FDI on economic growth, is low|
approximately in the 10th percentile from the least corrupt countries. As a robustness check,
we also conduct the regressions with additional explanatory variables, with the instrumental
variable (IV) method to address endogeneity problems, and with another corruption index.
As a result, our main ¯ndings are robust, implying that reducing corruption levels may lessen
the e®ect of FDI on economic growth. However, it is important to recognize that, because
corruption can have various negative impacts on the society, our ¯ndings do not imply the
2Although we use ¯ve-year average data from 1995 to 2008 for the estimation, based on World Development
Indicators 2009 released by the World Bank, FDI data are available only up to 2007. See the next section for
detailed explanations of data.
3Cambodian CPI was 1.8 in 2008, ranked 166 among 180 countries classi¯ed by the TI.
4Some studies investigate whether corruption promotes or hinders FDI in°ows. Wei (2003) indicates that if
¯rms need to pay bribes in a country in which it is engaging in FDI, bribery may function as extra taxes, and
corruption then hinders FDI. Alfaro et al. (2008) show that low institutional quality, including corruption, is
a main factor of a lack of capital °ows from rich to poor countries, as pointed by Lucas (1990). In contrast,
some studies, such as Egger and Winner (2005), provide evidence that corruption can be a factor promoting
FDI in°ows, as corruption may help to fasten bureaucratic procedure.
3
encouragement of corruption for promoting economic development.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the estimation method-
ology and data. Section 3 provides the main empirical results. Results from the robustness
check are presented in Section 4, and Section 5 is the conclusion.
2 Estimation methodology and data
As discussed above, the main purpose of this study is to investigate the e®ect of FDI on
economic growth by taking into account the role of corruption in each country. In addition
to FDI and corruption, following standard growth regression literature, some other determi-
nants that may in°uence economic growth are also included in the estimation equation as
independent variables. Our basic speci¯cation is expressed as follows:
Growthi = ¯0 + ¯1 ln (initinal GDP per capita)i + ¯2FDIi
+¯3Corruptioni + ¯4Xi + ui; (1)
where FDI is the share of net FDI in°ows in GDP; X is a set of control variables that may
in°uence economic growth; and u is the standard error term. Corruption is the two indices of
corruption provided by the TI and the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI). The detailed
de¯nitions of corruption and other variables are provided in Table A2 of Appendix A2.
The inclusion of initial GDP per capita in the estimation equation for capturing a conver-
gence e®ect is motivated by the seminal work of Barro (1991). In order to minimize possible
omitted variable bias on the coe±cients of focused variables, we include a number of control
variables in the basic estimation equation that are standard in growth regression. X includes
variables such as population growth, education, Sub-Saharan African dummy, Latin American
dummy, in°ation, government expenditures, and trade openness. The rationale underlying
our selection of these variables is based on preeminent previous studies for growth regression,
including Barro and Lee (1994), Easterly and Levine (1997), and Levine et al. (2000).
Next, to capture the role of corruption in the nexus of FDI and economic growth, our
basic speci¯cation is extended to include the interaction term between FDI and corruption.
This approach enables us to examine how corruption in°uences the e®ect of FDI on economic
growth, which is the main purpose of our study. The estimation equation incorporating the
interaction term between FDI and corruption is written as follows:
Growthi = ¯0 + ¯1 ln (initinal GDP per capita)i + ¯2FDIi + ¯3Corruptioni
+¯4FDIi £ Corruptioni + ¯5Xi + ui: (2)
Particularly, we pay attention to the partial e®ect of FDI on economic growth, which
varies with the level of corruption.
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@Growthi
@FDIi
= ¯2 + ¯4Corruptioni: (3)
For estimation, we use annual data from 132 countries spanning from 1995 to 2008. The
full list of countries is presented in Table A1 in Appendix A1. Following previous studies,
such as Bengoa and Sanchez-Robles (2003), as the main analysis we use the 5-year average
(1995 to 1999, 2000 to 2004, and 2005 to 2008) of each variable in order to mitigate short-
term economic °uctuations. Descriptive statistics of each variable are provided in Table A3
in Appendix A2.
We report the OLS estimation results as a benchmark case. Then, for the fact that the
OLS estimator may be biased due to endogeneity resulting from the omitted variables, reverse
causality, or measurement errors, we also conduct the IV estimation to overcome endogeneity
problems. In addition to 5-year average regressions, as a robustness check, we report the
results using the average value of each variable from 1995 to 2008 based on the OLS and
IV estimations. The regressions are also conducted with another corruption index from an
alternative source.
3 Empirical results
Our estimations start with the benchmark OLS regression, using the corruption perception
index (CPI) from the TI as a measure for corruption level. Table 1 shows the results of
this benchmark case. In columns (1) and (2), the coe±cients of FDI, and corruption are
not signi¯cant. This result is in line with that of Borensztein et al. (1998) and Alfaro
et al. (2004), suggesting that FDI alone does not necessarily promote economic growth.
Although the e®ect of education is not signi¯cant, the e®ects of regional dummies, in°ation,
government expenditures, and trade openness are signi¯cant and have the expected signs.
Next, to investigate how corruption in°uences the e®ect of FDI on economic growth, we add
the interaction term between FDI and corruption in column (3). The estimated coe±cient
of the interaction term is signi¯cantly positive and is robust among alternative speci¯cations
through columns (4) to (6).
[Table 1 here]
However, as discussed above, the OLS estimators may su®er from endogeneity problems
due to omitted variables, reverse causality or measurement errors. Regarding corruption,
there is a possibility of reverse casualty, running from economic growth to corruption, or of a
measurement error. To address the endogeneity issue, we employ the IV estimation, in which
the choice of appropriate instruments is important; instruments must be highly correlated with
an endogenous variable and do not directly in°uence dependent variable. In this analysis, we
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use legal origin, provided by La Porta et al. (1999), as the instruments for corruption.5 This
is because, as indicated by La Porta et al. (1999), Treisman (2000), and Billger and Goel
(2009), economic, political, and cultural factors are thought to be the main determinants of
corruption. Speci¯cally, La Porta et al. (1999) show that legal origin has a signi¯cant e®ect on
corruption. Likely, using the extreme-bounds analysis, Serra (2006) comprehensively examines
the determinants of corruption and points out that British legal origin is a crucial determinant
of corruption. Given these ¯ndings, legal origin highly in°uences current level of corruption,
but may not a®ect current economic growth.
Table 2 presents the results using the IV estimation. Speci¯cations in Table 2 are the same
as those in Table 1; however, British and Scandinavian legal origins are used as the instruments
for corruption. To test for the validity of instruments, we follow the method proposed by Stock
and Yogo (2005) who indicate a problem of weak instruments and develop the critical value in
F-statistics for the ¯rst stage regressions. The values of the F-statistics in our analysis are well
above those in Stock and Yogo (2005) in all columns (1) through (6). They also satisfy the
condition in the earlier approach, \rule of thumb", developed by Staiger and Stock (1997).6 In
addition, the Sargan test of overidenti¯cation cannot reject the orthogonality conditions even
at the 10 percent signi¯cance level. In columns (1) and (2), without considering the interaction
term between FDI and corruption, the results indicate that FDI does not promote economic
growth. In columns (3) to (6), we consider the interaction between FDI and corruption and
a set of additional explanatory variables to check for robustness. Each coe±cient of FDI
and its interaction with corruption becomes statistically signi¯cant. Furthermore, although
the coe±cient of corruption is not signi¯cant, the null hypothesis that both coe±cients of
corruption and its interaction term with FDI are simultaneously zero is rejected at the 5
percent signi¯cance level in the F test.
[Table 2 here]
From the estimated coe±cients of FDI and the interaction term, we can calculate the
threshold of corruption by separating the negative and positive partial e®ects of FDI on
economic growth. The e®ect of FDI on economic growth is negative if the corruption level is
below the threshold; it is positive if the corruption level is above the threshold. In column
(6), the threshold value of corruption is 1.44, which is in approximately the 10th percentile.
Given this result, FDI promotes economic growth in most countries and its impact increases
with corruption. Although this ¯nding is counter-intuitive, it has profound implications. As
a condition for ¯nancial support or aid, while international organizations such as the World
Bank and the IMF require an elimination of or reduction in corruption, pro¯t-seeking ¯rms
engaging in FDI may not be concerned with about corruption, and they may rather take
advantage of it and expand their investments in more corrupt countries.
5See the Appendix for a more detailed de¯nition of legal origin.
6Staiger and Stock (1997) insist that the F-statistic in the ¯rst stage should exceed 10.
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4 Robustness Analysis
To check for robustness, we ¯rst use the average value of each variable from 1995 to 2008
instead of the 5-year average, and present the estimation results in Table 3. Columns (1)
and (2) indicate that FDI alone does not signi¯cantly promote economic growth. In columns
(3) and (4), in which the interaction term between FDI and corruption are considered, the
coe±cients of FDI and their interaction with corruption are signi¯cant, and we can reject the
null hypothesis that the coe±cients of these two variables are jointly zero. As discussed above,
to account for the fact that corruption may be endogenous because of the omitted variables,
the causality may be reversed, or there may be measurement errors, the IV estimation is
conducted to handle the possibility of endogeneity problems. The instruments for corruption
used here are the same as those in the previous section's IV estimation. In columns (5)
and (6), the IV estimation illustrates that the e®ect of FDI on economic growth is still
insigni¯cant. When the interaction term between FDI and corruption is added in column
(7), the threshold of corruption inducing the positive partial e®ect of FDI is quite low. In
column (8), in which we control for variables such as in°ation, government expenditures and
trade openness, the threshold of corruption inducing the positive partial e®ect of FDI is 1.49,
which is approximately in the 10th percentile. From these results, it is evident that our main
¯ndings are robust even if the data of the whole sample (1995-2008) average is used instead
of 5-year average data.
[Table 3 here]
Next, we check the robustness of our results from the previous section, using a di®erent
corruption index obtained from the World Bank's WGI.7 The WGI provide data on the level of
controlling corruption for 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002 through 2008. To make our estimation
consistent with the previous analysis, we ¯rst conduct the regressions with 5-year average
data for each variable in consideration.
Table 4 presents the estimation results, using the index for corruption provided by the
WGI. Columns (1) and (2) show the results based on the OLS without the interaction term
between FDI and corruption. In this case, the coe±cient of FDI on economic growth is
not signi¯cant. In columns (3) and (4) where the interaction term is added, the FDI e®ect
on economic growth becomes signi¯cantly positive. To mitigate endogeneity problems, we
conduct the IV estimation in columns (5) through (8), where the speci¯cations are the same
as those in columns (1) through (4), respectively. The results of the IV estimation indicate that
7The TI and the WGI provide di®erent corruption indices created from di®erent original sources. The
TI's corruption perception index captures overall corruption perceptions among public o±cials and politicians.
The WGI's corruption index captures the perceptions of the extent to which public workers and o±cials in
a country abuse their public power for private interests, including both grand and petty corruption. Grand
corruption involves senior o±cials, ministers, and heads of state, while petty corruption entails immigration
o±cials, customs clerks, policemen, and similar positions.
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FDI does in°uence economic growth, but only when its interaction term with corruption is
included. In column (8), the threshold level for corruption, separating negative and positive
partial impacts of FDI on economic growth, is 0.53, which is approximately in the 10th
percentile. This result is similar to that of the case when the TI's corruption index is used.
[Table 4 here]
Our main results are robust to the change of corruption indices. In addition, employing
the IV estimation to address the endogeneity problems makes our main results more robust.
We ¯nd that corruption plays an important role as an absorptive factor enhancing the e®ect of
FDI on economic growth. Corruption levels for the threshold separating negative and positive
impacts of FDI is approximately in the 10th percentile. Speci¯cally, the threshold implies
that FDI inhibits economic growth in countries where corruption is below the threshold, and
promotes economic growth in countries where corruption is above the threshold.
5 Conclusion
By employing the data of 132 countries over the period from 1995 to 2008, we investigate
the e®ect of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) on economic growth, taking into account the
role of corruption in each country. The estimation results indicate that, while FDI alone
does not necessarily promote economic growth, it has a signi¯cant e®ect on economic growth
when its interaction term with corruption is considered. The threshold level of corruption
separating the negative and positive e®ects of FDI on economic growth is approximately
in the 10th percentile. The existence of the threshold implies that FDI inhibits economic
growth in countries where corruption is below the threshold, and promotes economic growth
in countries where corruption is above it. To address endogeneity problems, the IV estimation
is also conducted. The results indicate that our main implications are robust. Further, even
if a corruption index from an alternative source is used, our main implications do not alter.
The results of our study interestingly imply that reducing corruption may weaken the
contribution e®ect of FDI on economic growth. However, it is important to maintain that,
because corruption negatively a®ects the society in many ways beyond just economic devel-
opment, our ¯ndings should be interpreted with caution; they do not imply that corruption
should be encouraged.
Appendix
A1. List of countries in the sample
[Table A1 here]
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A2. Data de¯nitions, data sources, and descriptive statistics
[Table A2 here]
[Table A3 here]
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Figure 1: FDI net in°ows as a share of GDP (World, 1970-2007)
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